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Layman: Evidence

EVIDENCE
I. Tnm BEST EvInncE RUim
The Best Evidence Rule followed in South Carolina. is
generally in line with the rule followed in other states in that
the terms of the writing must be at issue and, if the original
document is unavailable, its unavailability must not be the
result of fault on the part of the person seeking to introduce it.1
There were several cases during the survey period in which the
Best Evidence Rule was in issue.
Among the most important of these cases was Shirer v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance (o.2 This case concerned the
financing of a motel by the defendant life insurance company.
The plaintiffs sought to recover a liquidated damage deposit
which had been demanded by the defendant in a letter which
contained the contract terms and had been mailed to the plaintiffs
during the negotiation period. When the defendant sought to
introduce the letter into evidence, the defendant could produce
only a carbon copy, the original being in the possession of the
broker who arranged the transaction.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in upholding the decision
of the trial judge not to admit the copy, noted a recent trend in
other states toward allowing certified copies to be introduced,
but still refused to allow the copy in question to be introduced.
It should be noted that the court has stated that the legislature
is the proper place to change the bad effects of the Best Evidence
Rule.8 In his book, A Guide to Evidence Law in South Carolina,
Professor Dreher asserts that there seems to be no reason why
a certified copy, made photostatically, possibly under the supervision of a court officer, should not be sufficient. If the sole
purpose of the rule is to insure the most accurate rendering
of the terms of a document which is the subject of the litigation,
4
then a photostatic copy should logically be the best substitute.
In a slightly different context but one concerning the Best
Evidence Rule, the court, following earlier cases, upheld the
principle that the trial judge has the final decision regarding a
1. J. DREHER, A Gums To EvIDENCE LAw IN SouTm CAROLINA 49 (1967),
citing C. McCORMicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 196 (1954).
2. 253 S.C. 232, 169 S.E.2d 621 (1969).
3. Griggs v. Driggers, 230 S.C. 97, 94 S.E2d 225 (1956).

CODE ANN. § 26-101 (1962).
4. J. DREHER, A GuIDE To EVIDENCE LAw IN

See also S.C.
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53 (1967).
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determination of whether the original has been proved sufficiently unavailable. The defendant in Windham v. Lloyd 5 sought
to protect his claim of title to a piece of land by introducing into
evidence a copy of a page from a deed book showing that the
deed to the land had been recorded, and also a photostatic copy
of the deed as recorded. 6 The court said that, before the proffered exhibits would be admissible, evidence must be introduced
to indicate that the original was unavailable; this requirement
prevented the court from admitting the defendant's exhibits,
since he merely stated that he had "given the deed to a lawyer"
many years before and failed to produce either the lawyer or a
plausible explanation for his inability to offer the original
in evidence. Relying on Macedonia Churck v. ColumhiaJ the
court held that there must be evidence introduced to prove that
the deed was lost. The court also re-affirmed that, absent a
clear showing of abuse, the trial judge has discretion to determine8
whether the document has been shown sufficiently unavailable.
A criminal action for support of an illegitimate child formed
the backdrop for further litigation involving the Best Evidence
Rule. In State v. Bailey" the defendant moved for a directed
verdict on the grounds that there was not sufficient evidence to
convict him of failure to support an illegitimate child. The defendant contested the facf that no birth certificate was introduced to prove that a child had in fact been born; the
prosecution instead relied upon the testimony of the alleged
mother of the child. The defendant's attorney asserted that
the "best evidence" that the child was born was a birth certificate, but the trial judge allowed the alleged mother's testimony
to enter the record without proof of the unavailability of the
birth certificate. The supreme court upheld the judge's ruling on
the basis of State v. Wagstaff1O where the court held that a
birth certificate was not necessary as the best evidence of the
age of a child. The rule followed by the court has been summarized as follows:
5. 253 S.C. 568, 172 S.E.2d 117 (1970).
6. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 26-805 (1962), which allows a party to introduce

a record of the deed, as allowed at common law, as well as use any other
method of proof allowed at common law. This provision is, of course, subject
to § 26-101, in that the original deed must be shown to be unavailable, or a
notice to produce must be sent to the adversary, and he must refuse to produce
the document.

7. 195 S.C. 59, 10 S.E.2d 350 (1940).

8. See Uzzel v. Horn, 71 S.C. 426, 51 S.E. 253 (1905).

9. 253 S.C. 304, 170 S.E2d 376 (1969).
10. 202 S.C. 443, 25 S.E.2d 484 (1943).
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In the absence of a contrary statutory provision, a
certificate of birth or other official record is not necessarily required to prove a person's age, the best evidence of such fact being the testimony of a person
having actual knowledge thereof."
Since the mother of the child obviously would have actual
knowledge of the child's age as well as his date of birth, the
court decided that her testimony was properly admitted.
II.

ImPEAcHifENT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

In deciding cases dealing with impeachment, the process of
impugning the credibility or veracity of a witness, the supreme
court stayed within the well-marked boundaries of previous
decisions. The main case in the impeachment area dealt, not
with the impeachment of a hostile witness, but with the impeachment of a lawyer's own witness. This situation arose in
State v. Harvey12 when the defendant's counsel called an agent
of the State Law Enforcement Division to testify concerning
statements 8 which the agent made to the defendant's relatives
when they came to visit the defendant while in jail awaiting
trial. The agent denied having made the statements; the attorney
for the defense then attempted to contradict the agent through
testimony from other witnesses, but the trial judge refused to
allow him to impeach his own witness on collateral matters. The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The court
noted that, in South Carolina, an attorney, in order to impeach
his own witness or have him declared hostile in order to use
prior inconsistent statements, must show actual surprise and
harm by the witness's testimony.' 4
Professor Dreher questions the wisdom of applying such an
ironclad rule:
The only reasons that have ever been given for it
are: (1) that the lawyer who calls the witness
"vouches" for his veracity, and (2) that without the
11. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 694 (1961).

12. 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d 657 (1969).

13. The statements concerned a possible "break" for the defendant in return
for cooperation with the state in preparing the case.

14. Sec State v. Trull, 232 S.C. 250, 101 S.E2d 648 (1958).

In this case,

the "surprise" was evidently inferred by the court; this case seems out of line
with the present views about surprise. See also State v. Nelson, 192 S.C.
422, 7 S.E2d 72 (1940), for an example of one type of notice that will give
the attorney knowledge and thus prevent him from impeaching his own

witness.
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rule the witness would be at the mercy of the calling
lawyer and therefore subject to coercion by him. An
answer to (1) is that, with the exception of experts, the
lawyer does not select his witnesses; he calls to the
stand those persons who have knowledge of the facts
under litigation ....

An answer to (2) is that the ap-

plication of the rule in many situations puts the calling
lawyer, and the court itself, at the mercy of a corrupted
witness. 15
If a legal contest is aimed at exposing the truth, then it
seems wrong to force an attorney who calls a witness to sit by
helplessly when a witness recants earlier statements upon which
the attorney has relied. One possible solution to this dilemma16
would be for the judge to call the witness himself, as he could
do at common law1'7 ; this would allow both attorneys to crossexamine the witness and establish or destroy his credibility. The
adoption of rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow an attorney to impeach his own witness,",
might possibly be an alternative solution.
The issue presented to the court in Spears v. Collins'9 was:
May the trial judge prohibit an attorney from pursuing a certain
line of questioning on cross-examination? The plaintiff, the
operator of a dancing studio, brought suit to collect the balance
due on a contract for 320 hours of dancing, lessons. The defendant attempted to bring out on cross-examination that the
plaintiff had pleaded guilty to a charge of child neglect and
also that he was not licensed to do business. The supreme court
upheld the action of the trial court in refusing to allow the
defendant to cross-examine about these matters. In doing this,
the court followed the general rule that the trial judge controls
the manner and the scope, as well as the method, of crossexamination. This discretion extends to prohibiting, as in this
case, the use of irrelevant questions in order to harass or
15. J. DREiaa, mspra note 1, at 16-17. See also C.
1, at § 38 (1954).

McCom IcK,

supra note

16. See Farr v. Thompson, 25 S.C.L. (Cheves) 577 (1839), for an example
of the length to which this rule has been carried. Protecting the witness seems
like a flimsy reason for applying this rule--what of the litigant whose
legitimate claim goes unredressed because of the treachery of a witness?
17. J. DREHER, supra, note 1, at 17 (1967). This right exists today also.

See J. DREHEa, supra note 1 at 3-4 (1967).
18. RED. R Crv. P. 43.
19. 253 S.C. 510, 171 S.E.2d 606 (1970).
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discredit the witness by introducing matters not at issue in the
20

suit.

A third case dealing with cross-examination was State v.
Hinson2 ' in which the defendant was on trial for assault and

battery with intent to kill. The defendant's attorney asked a
witness if he thought that Hinson "knew what he was doing" at
the time of the alleged shootings. The witness, who had been
present at the defendant's place of business at the time of the
shootings, was stopped by the judge, who sustained the solicitor's
objection to the question. The judge did, however, allow a question as to whether the defendant was in "normal control" at the
time of the incident. In his brief to the supreme court the
defendant contended that he had been unduly restricted in his
cross-examination of the witness, but the court found nothing
in the record to indicate that the judge had restricted the defendant in any way.

I.

C~omPxENOY - TE DADsw's STATUTE

Only one case concerning competency was decided by the
supreme court during the survey period, and that case dealt
with the so-called Deadman's Statute. 22 Broadly stated, the
statute prohibits certain persons from testifying as to transactions with a person deceased at the time of the trial.
In Shelley v. Shelley,2" on a second appeal,24 the court upheld
the trial court's decision for the plaintiff in a dispute over a
boundary line. The statute was cited in the appendix to the
opinion by the supreme court. The trial judge ruled that the
plaintiff and his wife were incompetent to testify at the trial,
since they stood to gain if they received a favorable verdict.
The supreme court, citing the general rule,2 5 affirmed the trial
court's ruling, since the Deadman's Statute is designed to prevent
a person from giving testimony which obviously cannot be
contradicted or corroborated by a dead man.
20. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 404 (1957).

21. 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962).
23. 253 S.C. 238, 170 S.E2d 764 (1969).

24. Shelley v. Shelley, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964) (first appeal).
25. See Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965), for an

examination of the rule as applied in South Carolina.
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IV.

H1EAtSAY -

BrooDHoUND EVIDENCE

In State v. Bostiek,2 6 in spite of the fact that the point was not
argued in the brief, the court dealt with the issue of testimony by
a bloodhound's owner as to the actions of the dog in tracking a
fugitive. In South Carolina the courts, following the majority
27
view, have reasoned that the owner is considered the witness.
Before such evidence will be admitted, an adequate basis, generally consisting of testimony showing the dog's blood line, his
training, and experience in tracking, must, however, first be
laid. 28 Basically, what must be established is the dog's "credibility."
V.

DFmONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE- PHOTOGRAPHS

A INegro defendant, in State v. Stallings,29 was charged with

the rape of a Caucasian girl. The solicitor attempted to introduce into evidence a photograph of the victim and some of her
bloodstained clothing. The defense objected on the grounds
that the evidence was irrelevant. The trial judge, however, overruled the objection; the supreme court, affirming, noted that the
determination of relevancy lies within the purview of the trial
judge and that his decision will be upset only upon a showing of
extreme abuse of discretion.30 The court further stated that, as
long as the photograph is not shown to be prejudicial to the
defendant, such evidence would be admissible, subject to the
trial judge's decision upon the issue of relevancy.
VI.

TEsTIoNY

CoNCERNING A PREwIous Surr

When may evidence, consisting of the pleading of the plaintiff
in an earlier suit, be introduced in a later suit? This issue faced
the supreme court in Young v. Martin,8 ' a complex case which
arose out of an automobile collision.
The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in October, 1967, which was settled after she filed suit in February, 1968.
26. 253 S.C. 205, 169 S.E.2d 608 (1969).
27. State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21 (1915).
70 Neb. 395, 97 N.W. 593 (1903).

Contra, Brott v. State,

28. 22A CJ.S. Criminal Law § 646 (1961).
29. 253 S.C. 451, 171 S.E2d 588 (1969).

30. State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961).

In this case, a

photograph of the defendant, who was tried for rape also, was introduced in

evidence as proof of his physical development. The state was attempting to
prove the element of force, necessary in a conviction for rape.
31. 173 S.E.2d 361 (S.C. 1970).
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In the interim the plaintiff was, however, involved in a second
accident which was the subject of this action. In the complaint
filed in the first suit, the plaintiff had alleged severe back, leg,
and neck injuries. The complaint filed in the second suit was
almost an exact copy of that filed in the first suit. Since it is
settled law 32 that one is liable only for those injuries which
result from his own negligent conduct, the defendant's attorney
sought to introduce the complaint in the first suit and also call
the attorney for the defense (who had negotiated the settlement)
in that first suit.
At the trial of the second action the plaintiff testified that
she had not filed an earlier suit or received any payment in
compensation as a result of the earlier suit. The trial judge,
however, refused to admit any of this evidence and likewise
refused an offer to place the defense attorney from the first
suit on the witness stand. The supreme court, reversing the
decision of the trial court, said that any evidence tending to
show the condition of the plaintiff at the time of the second suit
was relevant; upon the admission of such evidence the jury
could then properly determine the extent and severity of the
injuries received in the second accident. The court stated that
the defense attorney from the first suit should have been allowed
to testify for the same reason.
Parties are normally bound by their admissions or assertions
in earlier actions, even if there is no actual knowledge of matters
contained in prior pleadings, although this fact will affect the
weight given the evidence by the jury.38 This position is supported by the general weight of authority.3 4 The court noted
that the plaintiff had had an opportunity to explain the apparent
conflict in her testimony and had chosen not to do so, and that,
under these circumstances, the judge should have admitted the
evidence.
VIL

OPINION EVIDENCE -

EXPERT TESTo0NR

South Carolina has recently seen an increase in the number
of products liability cases concerning automobile manufacturers,
the most spectacular being Micide 'v. Blackmon, 5 a case which
32. W. PaossER, HANDB00x OF THE LAW OF ToRTS

§ 42 (3d ed. 1964).

33. Burlington v. Dixon, 196 N.C. 265, 145 S.E. 244 (1928).

34. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 303 (1964). An admission or statement in a
pleading may be placed in evidence if it is relevant and material to the issues
involved in the second action, so long as the person against whom the pleading
is to be introduced was a party to the first action.
35. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E2d 173 (1969).
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saw Ford Motor Company paying $312,000 in damages to a
young lady who was paralyzed from the neck down in an automobile accident. A case of note this year wag Redmo 'v. Ford
Motor Co.30 in which the supreme court upheld a lower court
decision for the plaintiff, although the court admitted that the
issue was close.
The main issues in the field of evidence revolved around the
testimony of an expert witness called by the plaintiff. The
issue upon which the case rested was whether the forces generated
in an automobile accident were sufficient to disengage the rear
axle bearing from the rear axle. When this disengagement
occurs., the automobile becomes uncontrollable. The plaintiff
contended that the axle detached from the bearing because of
negligence on the part of the defendant, Ford Motor Co. The
expert witness for the plaintiff was a mechanic with over fifty
years experience in the field of automotive service, repairs, and
maintenance. During this time he had supervised the separation
of axles and bearings, although he had never himself detached
the axle and bearing of a 1958 Ford, the model car in which the
plaintiff's intestate had been killed after the car had been driven
less than 1,000 miles.
In deciding this case, the supreme court was confronted with
several questions concerning expert testimony. The main question considered by the court dealt with the qualifications of an
expert witness. In deciding to allow expert testimony, the judge
must answer affirmatively two questions: (1) Is the subject
about which the expert will testify one of which the average
juror would have too little knowledge to make an intelligent
decision based only on the testimony of lay witnesses?; and (2)
Does this particular expert have the skill or knowledge necessary to testify so as to aid the jury in making its decision? 37
In South Carolina, as in most states, these two questions are left
with the judge, who must exercise his discretion with regard to
both the expert's qualifications s and the subject of the expert's
testimony. It should be noted that it is not necessary, in order
to qualify as an expert witness, for a person to be a scholar
or a professional man. As in this case, the expert can be a person
whose knowledge has been gained through long practical experience. In this case the trial judge decided that the expert was
36. 253 S.C. 266, 170 S.E2d 207 (1969).

37. C. McComicx, supra note 1, at § 13 (1954).
38. O'Kelley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 109, 14 S.E2d 58 (1941).
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qualified; the supreme court refused to question or upset the
trial judge's exercise of discretion.
There are two ways in which the expert's abstract knowledge
can be tied to a particular factual situation. One way is to
have the expert make an actual physical examination of some
object and give his conclusions based on that examination. The
other way is through the use of a hypothetical question based
on the facts of the case. The latter method was used in Redmon,
because the expert had not examined the bearing or the axle
in question, since these two items disappeared under mysterious
circumstances after being impounded.
In Redmon the witness answered the characteristically long,
detailed hypothetical question, but the defense objected on the
ground that allowing the witness to answer the question invaded
the province of the jury, since the question was addressed to the
ultimate issue of fact, whether defective manufacture was the
cause of the accident. On appeal the supreme court replied that
in an earlier case3 9 the court allowed testimony by experts on an
issue of fact which was ultimately to be decided by the jury and
approved the practice, since the jury would still have the final
decision as to the credibility of the expert and the consequent
weight to be given his testimony in reaching a verdict. The
Redmon court noted further that the issue was made much
closer because of the testimony of a Ford engineer which directly
contradicted that of the expert; in this case at least the verdict
rested on the jury's assessment of the two witnesses's credibility.
The defense also contended that allowing the expert to answer
the question without examining the axle and bearing led to
pure speculation and should not have been allowed, but the
supreme court again refused to disturb the ruling by the trial
judge; the court, finding no abuse of discretion, cited the expert's
wide experience in automotive affairs as a reason for permitting
the question.
The Redmom court thus upheld the general pattern of allowing
the trial judge to exercise his discretion in supervising the
testimony of experts in order to obtain the most benefit from
such testimony.
VIII. OPINION EVIDENCE - OPINION BY A LArBAN
The giving of opinions by non-expert witnesses is a subject
about which there is some confusion. Professor Dreher summarizes the general rule thus:
39. fd.
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There is no blanket rule against a witness expressing an
opinion. All that is prohibited ...

is the giving of an

opinion when the facts are capable of being so clearly
described that the jury can draw its own conclusion
....

Frequently the only way a witness can describe

something is by drawing an overall conclusion about it
from a mass of observed facts. 4 °
In Phillips v. K-Mart4l the plaintiff was injured by a fall in
the defendant's store. She alleged that the fall was caused by a
"white substance" left on the floor by store employees who had
been cleaning the floor. The plaintiff and another witness,
while trying to show knowledge on the part of the employees of
the store, testified that the white substance was swirled around
on the floor as if by a rag or mop. The defendant objected on
the ground that this was an opinion of the witness, but the trial
judge allowed the testimony to stay in the record. The supreme
court, sustaining the action of the trial judge, stated that the
witnesses, as a practical matter, would have been unable to
describe the condition of the floor without giving their opinion
as to how the floor looked. The court, following the general
rule42 summarized above, stated that a witness must sometime be
allowed to give an opinion so that the jury can better visualize
a situation or condition about which the witness is testifying.
In State v. Hinso 4 3 the trial judge allowed a witness to testify
on cross-examination as to the defendant's mental state at the
time he allegedly shot two South Carolina tax agents; at the
time of the shooting the agents were trying to confiscate the
defendant's supply of beer, the agents having confirmed that
he was selling beer on Sunday, a violation of state law.44 The
defense attorney asked the witness if he thought Hinson "knew
what he was doing," but the judge sustained the prosecution's
objection. The defense attorney then rephrased the question
to ask if the witness thought Hinson was in control of his
actions, to which he replied that he thought that he had never
seen Hinson so irrational.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the conviction of
Hinson for assault and battery with intent to kill. The opinion
40. J. DREHER, .supra note 1, at 8 (1967).

41. 173 S.E.2d 916 (S.C. 1970).
Sparks, 232 S.C. 414, 102 S.E.2d 435 (1958) ; State v. Ramey, 221 S.C. 10, 68
S.E2d 634 (1952).
43. 253 S.C. 607, 173 S.E2d 548 (1970).

42. E.g., State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965); Green v.

44. S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 4-204 (1962).
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by the court revealed that the witness had been in the defendant's store at the time of the shootings and had been acquainted
with Hinson for some time. The court, therefore, allowed the
layman's opinion as to the defendant's mental health to stand,
such decision being in accord with the generally accepted rule as
to the giving of opinion evidence by other than expert witnesses.
The general rule, which is the subject of some controversy, allows
a layman to assess the mental condition or state of an individual,
provided that the witness's conclusion is based on observed appearances and first-hand knowledge of the person. In addition,
the person testifying must have a more-than-casual acquaintance
with the party whose mental state is in issue. 5 Some states hold
that there is too much risk of unreliability involved in such
testimony and refuse to admit such testimony. South Carolina
has, however, in the past admitted testimony by non-experts
as to a person's mental state, 46 and this case seems to assert again
the court's belief in the wisdom of the rule. It should be noted
that the rule can cut both ways. The rule allowing such testimony can aid the jury by allowing it to hear the statements of
those who have had personal knowledge of a long acquaintance
with the defendant; when testimony about a person's mental state
approaches a revelation of a more permanent condition, a lay
witness might, however, mislead a jury, since he is unqualified to
testify at any length or in any depth in the area of the more
permanent or serious mental disorders. 47
Another contention raised by the defendant in Hinson concerned the testimony given by a doctor from the South Carolina
State Hospital about the condition of the defendant, in reply to
the statement by the lay witness that the defendant seemed
irrational. The defendant contended that the testimony should
have been introduced during the solicitor's case in chief, rather
than in reply. The supreme court refused to accept this contention. The court stated that in criminal trials there is a presumption of sanity operating in favor of the state, which must
be overcome by the witnesses for the defense,48 and that the trial
judge is the final arbiter who must determine at what point the
defense has shifted the burden of proof to the state, and whether
testimony should be made in reply or as part of the case in
45. 32 C.J.S. Evidenwe § 546(32) (b) (1964).

46. State v. Cain 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965).
47. But see 32 (iJ.S. Evidence § 546(29) (1964).
48. State v. Paulk, 18 S.C. 514 (1883).
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chief.49 Here, the court felt that the evidence produced by the
defense, that is, the statement on cross-examination that the
defendant was "irrational," was not sufficient to overcome the
burden of proof required to show that the defendant was not
sane at the time of the crime. The court thus upheld the decision
of the trial judge to allow the doctor, the only witness introduced by the state on the issue of sanity, to testify in reply
rather than in the case in chief.
IX.

CONDEMNATION

PROCEEDINGS

-EVIDENCE

OF VALUE

Specialized rules of evidence apply in condemnation proceedings. In South CarolinaState Highway Dep't,. Bryant,"
a case which became largely a debate over semantics, the defendant owned rural land upon which no improvements had been
made. This land was condemned by the State Highway Department, and this case arose out of a judicial proceeding to determine the price to be paid the owner.
At the trial one of the witnesses testified as to what he thought
was an accurate figure for the value of the land; he was subsequently asked how he arrived at the figure. The witness replied
that he arrived at the price by estimating the number of lots
into which the defendant's land could be divided and by then
determining the value of each lot. The highway department's
attorney objected on the ground that the price of land could not
be so estimated. He asserted that the price must be based upon
the value of unimproved rural land, not upon the value of
"lots." The supreme court, however, upheld the award based
upon the estimate; the court conceded the correctness of the
plaintiff's contention 5 ' but stated that the witness meant something different from what the plaintiff thought that he meant.
When the witness used the term, "lots", he was referring to
rural land upon which no improvements had been made, because
that was the common usage of that word in the area and because the witness at other times referred to the land as merely
"land." The court decided that these factors indicated that the
witness had not made his estimate incorrectly. The court
noted that the cost of grading and improving land cannot
correctly be added to the cost of the land in determining the
49. State v. Bradley, 210 S.C. 75, 41 S.E.2d 608 (1947).

50. 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349 (1969).
51. 4 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EmINENT DOMAIN § 12-342(1) (3d ed.

1950).
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value of the land for condemnation purposes, but found that
this method had not been used by the witness in this case;
rather, he took the price of one unimproved lot and multiplied
that by the number of unimproved lots into which the condemned land could be divided, this method being a permissible
way to estimate value.
X.

ADDENDA

In Wyatt v. 6Weenvile County52 the plaintiff was injured
when a storm drain cover gave way under his weight, turned
over, and caused him to fall into the storm drain. He brought
suit against the county, which was responsible for maintaining
the storm drain, under section 83-921 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws, this section permitting suits against a county
when a person is injured by the negligence of a municipal unit.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the evidence introduced
by the plaintiff was sufficient to create an issue of fact for the
jury. The supreme court summarized the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and decided that the evidence
as introduced showed overwhelmingly that the county had been
negligent. The plaintiff's evidence showed that the dangerous
condition had existed for quite some time and was known to the
employees of the county, who had cleaned the storm drain
several times. Further testimony showed that the condition
was known by those who lived in the neighborhood, but that the
plaintiff would have no reason to know of the hazard.
McHnm D. LAYmAw

52. 174 S.E2d 762 (S.C. 1970).
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